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The most serious challenge to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the Principle of 
Alternate Possibilities (PAP) comes in the form of a dilemma: either the counter- 
example presupposes determinism, in which case it begs the question; or it does not 
presuppose determinism, in which case it fails to deliver on its promise to eliminate 
all alternatives that might plausibly be thought to satisfy PAP. I respond to this chal- 
lenge with a counterexample in which considering an alternative course of action is 
a necessary condition for deciding to act otherwise, and the agent does not in fact 
consider the alternative. I call this a "buffer case," because the morally relevant al- 
ternative is "buffered" by the requirement that the agent first consider the alterna- 
tive. Suppose further that the agent's considering an alternative action--entering the 
buffer zone--is what would trigger the counterfactual intervener. Then it would ap- 
pear that PAP-relevant alternatives are out of reach. 
I defend this counterexample to PAP against three objections: that considering 
an alternative is itselfa morally relevant alternative; that buffer cases can be shown 
to contain other alternatives that arguably satisfy PAP; and that even if the agent's 
present access to PAP-relevant alternatives were eliminated, PAP could still be satis- 
fied in virtue of earlier alternatives. I conclude that alternative possibilities are a 
normal symptom, but not an essential constituent, ofmoral agency. 
Keywords: alternatives, buffer (buffer case, buffer strategy), decision, free will, lib- 
ertarian, moral responsibility, Principle of Alternate Possibilities. 
In Harry Frankfurt's famous counterexample to the Principle of Alternate Possi- 
bilities, or PAP--roughly, that one is morally responsible for an action only if one 
could have done otherwise--a "counterfactual intervener" named Black would 
have forced an agent named Jones to decide to murder a fellow named Smith if 
Jones hadn't decided to murder Smith on his own, making Black's intervention un- 
necessary. In such a situation, Frankfurt claimed, the agent seems morally respon- 
sible (Jones acted on his own without interference from Black), yet unable to do 
otherwise (Black was ready to nip any alternative in the bud). So PAP is false. ~ 
4 Black the Libertarian 
It is widely agreed that Frankfurt's original counterexample comes up short. 
Libertarian critics, in particular, have complained that Frankfurt's nefarious Black 
doesn't ake the hapless Jones's agency seriously enough. Suppose Jones is in- 
deed a libertarian agent. Now how exactly is Black to know when to intervene? 
"Black is an excellent judge of such things, ''2 Frankfurt blithely noted. But this 
won't do. Black's judgment, however excellent, must rest on some sign of how 
Jones will act. If the sign causally determines the indicated action, Frankfurt has 
begged the question against the libertarian defender of PAP. But if the sign does not 
causally determine the action, it's possible that the sign occur but Jones not act in 
the indicated way, in which case Black cannot reliably eliminate the possibility of 
Jones's acting otherwise. In either case, Frankfurt has failed to defeat PAP. 
In response to this and other objections, a second generation ofcounterexamples 
has sprung up. There are three in particular that I have found sufficiently persuasive 
to defend in print. One of these replaces the counterfactual intervener inFrankfurt's 
thought-experiment with the theistic God. Arguably, Jones can't do otherwise if
an infallible believer knew what he would do before he was even born. But we 
can also say of God's foreknowledge what Frankfurt said of Black's device: it 
"played no role at all in leading him to act as he did," "could have been subtracted 
from the situation without affecting what happened or why it happened in any 
way," is "irrelevant to the problem of accounting for [Jones's] action," and "does 
not help in any way to understand either what made him act as he did or what, in 
other circumstances, hemight have done "'3 So we should hold Jones morally re- 
sponsible in both cases. For this counterexample to succeed, however, one must 
reject (as I do) the various ubterfuges by which alternative possibilities have been 
defended against divine foreknowledge, and accept (as I also do) the conceptual co- 
herence of an infallible foreknower. Since many philosophers would reject at least 
one of these, the divine foreknowledge scenario can't be expected to break the di- 
alectical stalemate over PAP. Nor can this be expected from so-called blockage 
cases, which bring the walls of Locke's locked room right inside Jones's cranium. 4 
The idea here is to posit an actual sequence of mental states, which Smith tra- 
verses on his own, leading up to the decision to murder Smith; then to add the 
condition that, owing to a freakish coincidence, all alternative neural pathways hap- 
pen to be non-functional. The worry about such cases is that a blockage that form- 
fits snugly around Jones's actual mental sequence may beg the question against 
indeterminism. I'm not sure that it does; but then I'm not sure that it doesn't. 5 
This brings me to the third case, on which I will focus in this essay. I will first 
present the case and point out the distinctive f atures that (I claim) equip it to evade 
the libertarian charge of begging the question. I will then identify and respond to 
what I take to be the three strongest grounds for holding that this kind of case does 
not successfully eliminate all PAP-relevant alternatives. Assuming that I deal with 
these three objections atisfactorily, this third case--which carries considerably 
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less baggage than the first two cases--would appear to pose a serious difficulty 
for defenders of PAP. 
Buffer Cases 
Suppose that Black himself is a libertarian and that he approaches his "Jones prob- 
lem" with the full realization that he is dealing with a libertarianly free agent. Con- 
fronted with Frankfurt's original scenario--call it Assassin--Black knows that 
Jones could thwart him. So instead of looking for a sign that can operate as adver- 
tised only in a deterministic world, Black waits.., and gets a lucky break. He man- 
ages to catch Jones in a set of circumstances, and at a point in Jones's response to 
those circumstances, that allow Black to act, despite his libertarian convictions. 
Call this new scenario, which I will now describe, Revenge. 
Smith makes Jones the butt of a demeaning practical joke. The first thought that oc- 
curs to Jones, after ealizing what Smith has done to him, is that he would like to kill 
Smith. He goes for a walk, escaping the immediate pressures of the situation and giv- 
ing himself ample opportunity o pull back from this line of thinking. Given the kind 
of person Jones is, and given the situation in which he finds himself, the altemative 
of not killing Smith is not unthinkable for him; moreover, should he entertain this al- 
ternative, nothing would prevent him from deciding and acting on it. But Jones could 
decide (and act) otherwise only if he first considered acting otherwise, and he never 
does this (though e could); instead, he nurses his grievance without respite, while 
the idea of killing Smith becomes more and more attractive to him. Having finally 
decided to do the deed, he gets a gun, tracks Smith down, and shoots him dead. 
Before introducing the counterfactual intervener, let us note some of the salient 
features of Revenge as it has been described up to this point. In the first place, the 
idea of killing Smith comes to Jones unbidden (so the question whether he can do 
otherwise in this respect--i.e., not have the idea instead of having it----does not even 
arise). 6In the second place, once the idea has come before his mind, it is open to 
Jones to embrace the idea, thereby deciding to kill Smith, and it is open to him to 
dismiss the idea, thereby deciding not to kill Smith (so nothing constrains him 
one way or the other). Thirdly, given Jones's psychology and given the circum- 
stances in which he finds himself, including the fact that he is already thinking 
about killing Smith, he can avoid deciding to kill Smith only if he first considers the 
alternative of not killing Smith (so his considering not killing Smith--minimally, 
the conscious awareness, however brief, of not killing Smith as a possibility for 
him--is a necessary condition for his accessing an alternative tohis actual decision). 
Finally, Jones decides to kill Smith without ever considering the alternative of not 
killing Smith (so he makes his decision without deliberating). There is, I would 
suggest, no primafacie reason for regarding these features of Revenge, ither jointly 
or severally, as incompatible with Jones's moral responsibility. 
6 Black the Libertarian 
The final element to be added to Revenge is the counterfactual intervener, which 
differs from the device in Assassin inasmuch as it is programmed to hijack Jones's 
mental processes and force him to decide to kill Smith if he so much as considers not 
killing Smith. With this device in place, there is no alternative toJones's deciding to 
kill Smith: Jones can decide otherwise only if he first considers doing so, but then 
the device will force him to decide to kill Smith. So an alternative decision is not 
available to Jones in Revenge. Yet Jones, who in fact proceeds to murder Smith on 
his own, leaving the device untriggered, seems morally responsible for killing 
Smith. PAP is therefore wrong when it makes moral responsibility rest on the avail- 
ability of morally relevant alternatives. 7 
Before continuing, we need to replace our vague gesture toward PAP with 
something more definite. Here's a formulation that is reasonably perspicuous: 
PAP An agent X is morally responsible for performing an action A only if X 
did something B (which might or might not be identical to A) such that (i) X 
could have refrained from doing B and (ii) it is at least in part in virtue of X's 
having been able to refrain from doing B that X is morally responsible for per- 
forming A. 
With this formulation i hand, we can now take stock. Revenge differs from As- 
sassin in that it contains a"buffer zone" between the agent's actual pathway and any 
alternative pathways that might plausibly satisfy PAP. Entering the buffer zone trig- 
gers the intervener, so PAP-relevant alternatives are all out of reach. "Buffer cases" 
like Revenge, where intervention is triggered by a necessary condition for access- 
ing a morally relevant alternative, appear to escape the usual objections to Frank- 
furt counterexamples likeAssassin, which rest on the supposition that he prior signs 
to which the mechanism is responsive constitute sufficient conditions for the agent's 
performing or refraining from B (absent intervention by the mechanism). 
Two kinds of objections can be brought against this "buffer strategy." One kind 
grants that Revenge liminates all of Jones's morally relevant alternatives, while 
denying that Jones is then morally responsible for deciding to kill Smith; the other 
accepts Jones's moral responsibility while insisting that non-buffered alternatives 
remain. Because the second kind of objection seems to me to be the more serious 
of the two, it is the one that I will pursue in the remainder of this paper. In particu- 
lar, I will look at three objections to the effect hat, insofar as Revenge is a case in 
which Jones is genuinely responsible for his actions, it is a case in which alterna- 
tives sufficient to satisfy PAP are in fact available. 8 
The First Objection 
In Revenge, as in Assassin, the counterfactual intervener cannot act quickly enough 
to squelch the triggering event itself. So this event--in Revenge, Jones's consider- 
ing not killing Smith--remains anopen possibility. But then Jones, who in actual- 
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ity does not consider not killing Smith, has available to him an alternative course of 
action that the pro-PAP party can exploit. 
Reply 
Whatever might be said of the residual alternatives in traditional Frankfurt coun- 
terexamples like Assassin, the alternative l ft open in Revenge does not satisfy 
clause (ii) of PAP. If, as in Revenge, an agent is morally responsible in virtue of 
being blameworthy, a PAP-relevant alternative should be such that, by accessing 
it, the agent would avoid (or mitigate) blame; but merely considering the possibil- 
ity of not killing Smith would have no effect by itself on Jones's blameworthiness. 9 
Compare this case with Smoker, in which Jack realizes that his first-order de- 
sire for cigarettes stands a good chance of yielding to his second-order desire to 
quit smoking if (but only if) he joins a 12-step rogram, while Mack, a smoking 
buddy who fears he will be left to smoke alone if Jack quits, stands ready, should 
Jack join the program, to slip him a pill which would make his craving for nico- 
tine irresistible. Then Jack cannot access a decision to quit smoking, but he can 
decide to join the 12-step program. A defender of PAP might with some plausibil- 
ity appeal to this alternative's availability to explain Jack's moral responsibility in
the case where he doesn't join the program and continues to smoke "on his own," 
without he help of Mack's pill. But the appeal is plausible only on the assump- 
tion that Jack, in the alternative sequence of events, joins the program as a means 
toward quitting. (Contrast this with a case in which he joins the program in order to 
make the acquaintance of an attractive woman who attends the meetings: this al- 
ternative possibility, accessed for this reason, would not satisfy PAP.) In Revenge, 
however, undertaking toconsider not killing Smith is not something that Jones does 
as a necessary means toward the goal of not killing Smith. Indeed, it would ap- 
pear that undertaking to consider not killing Smith could not play this role for 
him, inasmuch as it would impose on him the incoherent task of considering not 
killing Smith (in order to take not killing Smith as his intended end) before under- 
taking to consider not killing Smith. (Alternatively and more coherently, Jones 
might engage in two, possibly continuous, considerings, the second of which would 
be morally significant because done as a means toward deciding not to kill Smith. 
In Revenge, however, this second considering won't be available to Jones, since the 
first PAP-irrelevant considering would trigger the intervener.) 
We might give this objection more credit han it's due because we think Jones 
should have considered not killing Smith: we blame him, not only for deciding to 
kill Smith, but also for not even considering not killing him. Since we hold him 
responsible for this failure, and an alternative was available to him (nothing pre- 
vented Jones from considering not killing Smith), Revenge appears to contain at 
least one action that satisfies PAP. 1~ But this only satisfies the PAP-requirement for 
his not considering not killing Smith; it doesn't show PAP to be satisfied for his 
8 Black the Libertarian 
deciding to kill Smith, nor does it appear that responsibility for the latter could sim- 
ply piggyback on the former. The job of the Frankfurtian objector is to produce a
single case in which PAP fails, not to show that it never succeeds. 
This first objection is a generalized version of the typical first-blush negative re- 
action to Frankfurt-type counterexamples: that Jones could (and should) have tried 
to do/decide otherwise, and that if he does try and the device then intervenes, he has 
satisfied his moral obligations. Revenge is an improvement over Assassin, because 
Jones can't even try. Revenge rules out the possibility of trying (to decide) to refrain 
from murder, because one must consider doing X before trying to do X, allowing 
the device to intervene to prevent the trying before it can be initiated. 11 
The Second Objection 
It is simply not true that Jones's only immediate options, given that he is currently 
thinking about killing Smith, are either bringing this thought to fruition by decid- 
ing to kill Smith, or else replacing this thought with the alternative thought of not 
killing Smith. Jones might, for example, simply fail to decide to kill Smith, without 
ever considering not killing him; in this case the triggering event would not occur, 
and Jones would avoid killing Smith. 
Reply 
To count as an alternative satisfying PAP, Jones's refraining from deciding to kill 
Smith must be something that Jones does; it can't be something that is done to him, 
or that simply happens. It is the former kind of refraining for which Jones's con- 
sidering not killing Smith serves in Revenge as a necessary condition. Now any 
case of Jones's not deciding to kill Smith will be a case of Jones's refraining (in this 
sense), or it won't be. If the latter--as when, e.g., Jones fails to decide to kill Smith 
because he is himself killed, or is overcome by sleep, or is distracted by a loud ex- 
plosion (after which he forgets what he had been thinking about)--the alternative 
is of the wrong sort to satisfy PAP. If Jones is morally responsible for killing Smith, 
it isn't in virtue of these alternative possibilities, the actualization of which would 
simply make Jones the beneficiary of "moral luck." But if the alternative is a gen- 
uine case of refraining, it's not clear why we can't simply stipulate in setting up the 
example that Jones can move to this alternative from his present course of action 
only by first considering this alternative. Whether or not any actual agents are so 
constituted, it's hard to see why the supposition that Jones is so constituted would 
disqualify him as a moral agent. But then the mechanism can intervene to prevent 
Jones from accessing this alternative. 
Perhaps the does/done-to-him distinction on which this initial reply rests is too 
artificial to cover all the alternatives the objector has in mind, making it possible 
to pass between the horns of the dilemma. Let us therefore consider one way things 
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might go that does not fit neatly into this rubric. It would seem that Jones could 
leave the decide-to-kill-Smith track, not just via a consideration f the possibility 
of not killing Smith, or under the prompting of an intervening cause, but in direct 
reaction against his contemplated course of action. Suppose, for example, he ap- 
proaches Smith with gun drawn and suddenly realizes what it is he is about o do; 
he then flees in horror. Here he moves to the alternative pathway, not because he 
is attracted to it (he couldn't be attracted to it without first considering it, and this 
would trigger the intervener), but because he is repelled by what he is actually 
contemplating. There is some plausibility to the claim that he could and should 
have been affected in this way. The mechanism can certainly be reset o prevent 
Jones's reaching a contrary decision along this new route, but it can't intervene 
until Jones takes the first step along this route, and the fact that his first step is open 
to Jones seems morally relevant to his culpability for murder. At least it seems more 
relevant than the alternative ofmerely considering not killing Smith. For one thing, 
feeling bad about a prospective course of action represents a real if minimal de- 
parture from moral neutrality, whereas imply entertaining an option does not (by 
itself) commit he agent, even incipiently, to one side or the other. What's more, if 
Jones were to refrain from deciding to murder Smith, his discomfort at the thought 
of killing Smith might help explain why he didn't decide to kill Smith, whereas 
his having considered not killing Smith could not similarly explain why he opted 
for this outcome rather than the other. 12 
The problem with this reply is that we still need to understand how the avail- 
ability of this overlooked altemative might satisfy PAP. It's hard to see how it could 
do so unless the alternative in question--feeling bad, entertaining a doubt, mak- 
ing a negative judgment--ipsofacto put any decision to kill Smith in abeyance. But 
it obviously does no such thing: any negative reaction to Smith's murder on Jones's 
part might be outweighed in Jones's mind by other factors; or Jones's trajectory 
toward action might be akratically impervious to moral qualms, prudential calcu- 
lations, and the like. PAP's defenders need an alternative that would allow the agent 
to avoid blame, and feeling bad or conflicted about what one is doing simply fails 
to do the job. So even assuming that Jones could react in the described way, ac- 
quiring a negative attitude toward his proposed action in one simple step, it's doubt- 
ful that this would rescue PAP. But one might also challenge the assumption. Let 
Revenge be fine-tuned so that Jones's responding in the suggested way would be 
completely out of character for him: someone who responded in this way just 
wouldn't be Jones. Perhaps Jones has killed before, on a number of occasions and 
in similar circumstances. He isn't such a hardened criminal that he can't view his 
actions from a moral point of view and feel an appropriate r vulsion; but the idea 
that this person might be heading straight toward murder, looking neither to the 
right nor the left, and suddenly, in one simple step, undergo aPAP-relevant shift 
in attitude, seems like an appeal to magic. This is to expect oo much of him, and 
the judgment that he is morally responsible for killing Smith surely does not rest on 
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this expectation being a reasonable one. This attempt to evade the dilemma posed 
in the first paragraph of this reply is a failure. 
The Third Objection 
If there are no PAP-relevant alternatives once Jones finds himself thinking about 
killing Smith, there may still be PAP-relevant alternatives available prior to the events 
described in Revenge. Inparticular, Jones's responsibility for killing Smith might de- 
rive from his responsibility for being a certain kind of person (e.g., the kind of 
person who could decide to kill someone, without even considering doing other- 
wise, just because he was humiliated by him), which in turn is grounded in earlier 
character-forming choices which themselves satisfy PAP. 13 
Reply 
I believe that this objection fails on at least two counts. First, it simply challenges 
the critic of PAP to concoct settings for these earlier character-forming episodes 
that are themselves structurally similar to Revenge, in that a counterfactual inter- 
vener is present and the only PAP-relevant alternatives are buffered alternatives. 
Since the objector's appeal to ancient history is an apparent admission that Revenge 
itself contains no PAP-relevant alternatives accessible to Jones, it's not clear on 
what grounds the objector might insist that these earlier alternatives could not be 
rendered similarly inaccessible. 
Call this extension of the buffer strategy into Jones's past Global Revenge. There 
is one significant difficulty with this response that needs to be addressed before 
moving on to the second reply to the objection.14 For Jones's earlier episodes of 
moral agency to conform to the pattern of Revenge, considering an alternative must 
always be a necessary condition for Jones to access that alternative, the device must 
be set to intervene if this necessary condition is satisfied, and the necessary condi- 
tion must never be satisfied. This means that the Jones of Global Revenge apparently 
never considers an alternative to what he actually does, and such a person just seems 
too weird to count with any confidence as a moral agent: always acting on the first 
thought hat pops into one's head is surely a sign of arrested evelopment, neuro- 
logical disorder, or other defect.55 But it's one thing to recognize a deficiency in 
this person's agency; it's another thing to say just what is missing. 
In Revenge, Jones considers, wills, and then executes the tokening of a specific 
action-type. One way to understand the connection between Revenge and a putative 
character-forming episode is to suppose that there is some action-type A- -one 
that the objector egards as morally perspicuous--which is tokened on both occa- 
sions. It's because of this similarity of type that Jones's responsibility on this ear- 
lier occasion can "transfer" to his decision in Revenge, despite his inability to ac- 
cess an alternative to this decision. Moreover (the objector might continue), this 
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earlier episode can be genuinely character-forming, entitling it to confer responsi- 
bility on later A-episodes, only if Jones, on that occasion, considered both A and 
not-A, and then decided and acted on his own, without he ministrations of the de- 
vice. This suggests that the objector's real complaint against Global Revenge is 
something like this: 
(G) There is no occasion on which Jones has considered oing A and con- 
sidered not doing A and then reached his own decision about what to do, with- 
out interference from the device. 
This is of course true in Global Revenge, since the elimination of PAP-relevant al- 
ternatives requires that either Jones's considering A or his considering not-A serve 
as a trigger for the device's intervention, and his considering both guarantees its 
intervention. 
It may be possible to challenge (G) by distinguishing two senses in which one 
might consider a possible action prior to deciding to perform it. One sense is the- 
oretical, which might be rendered this way: 
(a) I might do A. 
This is a simple recognition that A is among the things that it is possible for me to 
do. But a second sense is practical: 
(b) Would that I might do A? 
Here I consider A with an eye toward whether to do it. An affirmative answer to this 
question might be captured this way: 
(c) Would that I might do A! 
If (b) is the necessary condition for (c) that serves as a trigger for the intervener, the 
agent can consider alternatives in sense (a) without having his freedom overrid- 
den. The critic of Global Revenge, however, will almost certainly insist that a moral 
agent must have experience of considering alternate possibilities in sense (b), not 
just in sense (a). 
I 'm not at all sure that the objector isn't simply begging the question against 
the anti-PAPist by insisting on this requirement. But let me accept he challenge 
and suggest some examples, of varying value, designed to cast doubt on the idea 
that (G) undermines Jones's responsibility in Global Revenge. 
The Supreme Agent. On some views, at least, God never considers alternatives 
before acting, though he is the supreme agent. 16 If this is correct, then agency per 
se does not require a consideration of alternatives at some point in the agent's his- 
tory, and the burden of proof is on the one who thinks that human agency in 
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particular requires uch a consideration. This is all the more true if human agency 
is most fully agency insofar as it imitates divine agency. 17 
Mother Love. A mother who dies while rescuing her newborn child from a 
burning building is morally praiseworthy for so doing, even (perhaps especially) 
if she never considers doing otherwise, and the presence of a Frankfurt mechanism, 
programmed to make her decide to save the child if she considers not doing so, 
would do nothing to mitigate our praise. If the mother's moral responsibility in 
this case depends on there being some (earlier) occasion on which she considered 
doing A, considered not doing A, and chose between them, what would A have to 
be so that the requirement would be even remotely plausible--that is, that her 
praiseworthiness in this case could piggyback on that? 
The Rehearsal. When a parent risks his or her life for a child, the parent's ac- 
tion seems natural in a way that might not require character formation. (Perhaps 
it's acting in the contrary manner that would require explanation i  terms of ear- 
lier character-deformation episodes). But even where character development is 
relevant and indeed necessary, it isn't always necessary to achieve it through ac- 
tual episodes of moral choice. Agents sometimes rehearse choices for later, in sit- 
uations in which they are not in fact presented with the choice or even in a posi- 
tion to be presented with it. This happens when agents entertain "what-if" 
scenarios, reflect on the experiences of role-models who have been in similar situ- 
ations, read edifying contes moraux, listen to sermons on the subject, or take an 
ethics course. 
Tax Evasion. Of the various events that could serve as triggers for a counter- 
factual intervener, considering an alternative before undertaking to access it is ar- 
guably the one best qualified, in the greatest number and variety of cases, to fill 
the role of a genuinely necessary condition on doing otherwise. It is for this rea- 
son that it makes a good universal tripwire for the alternative-eliminator in Global 
Revenge. But there are also occasions on which it is plausible to suppose some 
further necessary condition for accessing a morally relevant alternative, beyond 
merely considering the alternative. For example, when a person has some initial in- 
clination to do something, doing otherwise may require not only considering the al- 
ternative, but considering some reason for doing otherwise. Or when strongly 
tempted to do something, resisting the temptation may require not only considering 
the alternative and having some reason for choosing the alternative, but also at- 
taching sufficient weight to the reason. Derk Pereboom's Tax Evasion, in which a 
man cheats on his taxes and might have refrained from cheating only if a moral rea- 
son had occurred to him with sufficient force, is a case of this sort. In such cases, 
the device may be programmed to intervene when and only when one of these fur- 
ther necessary conditions is satisfied, allowing Jones to consider both A and not- 
A without he device automatically interfering in his decision process.18 
So much for the first response to the objection, which takes over the alternative- 
elimination strategy employed in Revenge and endeavors to apply it to earlier 
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episodes that are candidates for character-formation. Thesecond response is that 
it's not clear that the appeal to earlier alternatives does the job even when such al- 
ternatives are available. The problem is that character-forming choices appear to 
explain the wrong thing when it comes to cases like Revenge (or, for that matter, 
Assassin). In Sociopath, for example, Jones is such that the kind and degree of hu- 
miliation he suffered at Smith's hands makes the decision to kill Smith psycho- 
logically irresistible. In this case Jones's moral responsibility may piggyback on 
earlier choices by which he became the kind of person who can't do other than 
murder Smith. (If there were no earlier choices of the right sort---e.g., if Jones's so- 
ciopathy were primarily the result of brain chemistry, or abuse he suffered as a 
child--this would mitigate Jones's responsibility, as PAP implies.) But Revenge is 
not Sociopath; the Jones of Revenge, absent the counterfactual intervener, is free to 
decide or not to decide to kill Smith. Whether Jones is the kind of person who 
would commit murder when humiliated, without giving it a second thought, de- 
pends on what he ends up doing, and so long as it is possible for him to do other- 
wise, it is possible for him to show by his actions that he is not that kind of per- 
son, despite arlier character-forming choices. Adding the intervener changes 
nothing. Jones now has no morally relevant alternative, but this is owing to the 
presence of the device, not to the formative power of some earlier choice whose sat- 
isfaction of PAP might apply, by extension, to Jones's choice in Revenge. The ap- 
peal to earlier character-forming choices does not successfully engage the chal- 
lenge posed by buffer cases. 
Conclusion 
These seem to me to be the strongest grounds for thinking that Revenge harbors 
altematives sufficient to satisfy PAP. I think these grounds are inadequate, for the 
reasons given above. Black the libertarian could participate inRevenge confident 
that a Jones who decided on his own to murder Smith could not have decided oth- 
erwise. If this is correct, then accessible alternatives are merely a normal symptom 
of morally responsible agency: they should not be identified, even in part, with 
the underlying condition of which they are symptomatic, any more than spots are 
to be identified with measles. And what is the underlying condition, in the case of 
moral responsibility? That's a very good question. 19 
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pp. 195-227, and "Freedom, Foreknowledge and Frankfurt," Moral Responsibility and Alter- 
native Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, eds. David Widerker 
and Michael McKenna (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Pub. Ltd., 2003), pp. 159-83. 
6. It might be objected that Jones could have done something about being the kind of person to 
whom such a thought would come unbidden in the specified circumstances; it's therefore not true 
that he could not have avoided having this thought, for he would have avoided it if he had taken 
advantage ofalternatives that were available to him in earlier character-forming episodes in his 
life. This objection can be circumvented with a slight modification to Revenge. Suppose the 
thought of killing Smith is planted in Jones's mind by an external source--perhaps even by 
Black's mechanism. So its coming to be there has nothing to do with Jones being one kind of 
person rather than another. But given that it's there, Jones's duty is now to accept or reject his 
idea, and nothing constrains him one way or the other. (A related objection appeals to earlier 
choices that formed Jones into the kind of person who would accept he idea of killing Jones, 
once the idea occurred to him. This objection cannot be handled by a simple revision in the terms 
of Revenge. I take up this objection later in the paper: see The Third Objection and Reply.) 
7. I first presented a case like this one in "Moral Responsibility and Unavoidable Action," where 
it took a backseat to my development of the blockage strategy. Derk Pereboom independently 
developed a similar case: his Tax Evasion, like Revenge, mploys necessary ather than sufficient 
conditions as the mechanism's trigger. See Pereboom's Living without Free Will (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 18-37. 
8. What follows is largely taken from a section ("Three Objections Claiming the Presence of Alter- 
natives") of my "Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives," Midwest Studies in Philoso- 
phy, vol. 29: Free Will and Moral Responsibility, eds. Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein, 
guest editor John Martin Fischer (Boston & Oxford: Blackwell Pub., 2005), pp. 126--145. Read- 
ers interested in the first kind of objection, which I ignore in the present paper, will find it treated 
in another section of the Midwest Studies paper ("Three Objections Claiming the Absence of 
Moral Responsibility"). 
9. I should make clear that I am not here proposing any necessary and/or sufficient conditions for 
the sort of moral relevance that would qualify an alternative tosatisfy clause (ii) of PAE John 
Davenport ("The Deliberative Relevance of Refraining from Deciding: A Response to McKenna 
and Pereboom", Acta Analytica 21:4 (2006), 62-88) presents two cases--"One Lie Leads to 
Another" and "Pool Party"--which seem to me to raise interesting questions about whether 
any very simple account of the moral relevance in question can succeed. What I am claiming is 
that Jones's merely considering whether to murder Smith, in the context of Revenge (as speci- 
fied), need not constitute an alternative satisfying PAE Of course Revenge could be modified 
by introducing some of the psychological complexity to which Davenport draws our attention, 
and the result might well be more favorable to PAP--e.g., if Jones refrains from considering 
not killing Smith because he subconsciously fears that this might pave the way for his deciding 
not to kill Smith, we might agree that the availability of this unactualized alternative could then 
be relevant to his culpability for deciding to kill Smith. But this is a different case than the one I 
have described, and the existence of cases in which PAP is satisfied oes nothing to rescue PAP 
from the Frankfurtian critique. PAP is in trouble if there is a single counterexample to it, and 
my claim is that Revenge (that very case, and not some neighboring case involving Sartrean "bad 
faith," etc.) is just such a counterexample. 
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10. Daniel von Wachter made this objection when I presented the paper at Oxford in 2003. 
11. Audiences at oral presentations of the paper have been more likely to raise this objection than 
any of the other five. 
12. The basic objection conveyed in this paragraph was suggested tome (independently) by Robert 
Merrihew Adams and Gordon Pettit. 
13. The idea that moral responsibility ultimately rests on earlier character-forming episodes which 
themselves satisfy PAP is most closely associated with Robert Kane; see especially his The Sig- 
nificance of Free Will. 
14. I want to thank Gordon Pettit for raising this objection when I presented the first draft of this 
paper at the University of Notre Dame. 
15. A Thomistic analysis of this strange individual might go like this. He has a powerful intellect, 
inasmuch as he is able to discern the good in any end as soon as he considers it; but he has a weak 
will, inasmuch as his appetite for the good is always moved by the first object proposed to it, 
before his intellect has a chance to consider alternative ends. 
16. Descartes, for example, maintains in Meditation IV that God would have no need to deliberate. 
17. This paragraph makes no mention of moral responsibility, which would apply to God (if it 
applies at all) in a very different sense than it applies to human beings. But it's not God's acting 
without considering the alternative(s) that makes his status with respect to moral responsibility 
different than that of human beings. 
18. Living without Free Will, pp. 18-22. 
19. Versions of this paper have been read at the University of Notre Dame, Westmont College, 
Oxford University, the University of California t Riverside, the University of Minnesota t 
Morris, and Talbot School of Theology, as well as at the 2000 Eastern Division meeting of the 
American Philosophical Association and the 2006 Bled Conference on Free Will. I want to thank 
the audiences at these venues as well as my commentators (Daniel von Wachter at Oxford, 
Michael McKenna at the APA). 
Received: October 2006 
Revised: November 2006 
David P. Hunt 
Department ofPhilosophy 
Whittier College 
Whittier, CA 90608 
U.S.A. 
Dhunt @ whittier.edu 
